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ABSTRACT 
What behavior can be explained as the Bayes equilibrium of 
some game? The main finding is almost anything, Given any Bayesian 
(coordination) game with positive priors and given any vector of 
nondominated strategies, there is an increasing transformation of 
each utility function such that the given vector of strategies is a 
Bayes (Nash) equilibrium of the transformed game. Any nondominated 
behavior can be rationalized as Bayes equilibrium behavior, Some 
comments on the implications of these results for game theory are 
included. 
THE SCOPE OF THE HYPOTHESIS OF BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM 
John 0. Ledyard*
I. INTRODUCTION 
There has recently been much success in explaining a variety 
of diverse economic behaviors as outcomes associated with the Bayesian 
equilibrium of a game. One of the more elegant examples can be found 
in the use of the revelation principle and the hypothesis that a 
coordination mechanism be incentive compatible, and efficient, to 
derive restrictions on the form of optimal auctions. The power of this 
approach can be seen in Matthews [121, Milgrom and Weber [141, Myerson 
[171, Myerson and Satterthwaite [181, Wilson [211, Wilson [221 and 
Gresik and Satterthwaite [41. In this research, a standard set of 
simplifying assumptions appears. These frequently include risk­
neutral agents with quasi-linear preferences and independently 
distributed private values. An unanswered question is whether it is 
the assumption of Bayes equilibrium behavior or the assumptions of 
specific utility functions and beliefs which drive the results. If 
the former, then the assumptions are merely simplifying and the 
conclusions of research in this area can be widely applied; if the 
latter, then the assumptions are substantive and care must be taken 
not to attribute too much to any particular result. 
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:ro sort this out I simply ask, "what aggregate behavior can be 
rationalized as the Bayesian equilibrium of some game?" Economists 
will recognize a close similarity to the question, "what can be an 
aggregate excess demand function?" (Sonnenschein [201). I am 
interested, therefore, in the content of Bayesian equilibrium and 
incentive compatibility as positive theories. I strongly believe that 
they are sensible normative principles for guiding the behavior of 
individuals in strategic situations with incomplete information; but 
unless the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium provides implications 
independently of the specific functional form of utilities and 
beliefs, it may be of little use as a positive model to explain actual 
observations. In particular, it would then be a mistake to identify 
certain observed behavior or institutions as "not sensible." 
The basic components of models which utilize Bayesian analysis 
are admirably detailed in Myerson [171 to which I refer the novice 
reader. These components are agents, their preferences over outcomes, 
their beliefs, and a mechanism for converting messages of the agents 
into outcomes. Consistent with Bayesian analysis, it is also assumed 
that beliefs can be represented as probability measures and behavior 
can be derived from maximization of expected utility functions which 
are consistent with both preferences and beliefs. The content of the 
Bayesian equilibrium hypothesis obviously depends on whether or not 
these components are restricted g priori to some admissible subset.
To make a systematic inquiry into the explanatory power of that 
hypothesis, we will successively tighten the g priori restrictions on
these components and identify what behavior remains consistent with 
the hypothesis. As we will see, the restrictions must be very severe 
before any meaningful implications for behavior arise, 
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I begin, in Section III, by applying a slight variation of the 
revelation principle, due to Gibbard' [3) , which significantly 
simplifies the analysis. Referring to the combination of preferences, 
beliefs, and utilities as the environment (Hurwicz [7]), we observe 
that, subject to some informational restrictions, behavior in the 
context of a specific mechanism, or game form, is a Bayesian 
equilibrium in some admissible environment if and only if there is an 
admissible environment such that the performance function, the 
composite mapping of the specified strategies and outcome rules, is 
itself an incentive compatible direct revelation mechanism. This 
means that if we can identify the class of direct revelation 
mechanisms for which there is an admissible environment such that that 
mechanism is incentive compatible, then we will know what observed 
behavior is consistent with the Bayesian equilibrium hypothesis. 
In Section IV,2 we show that without further restrictions on 
the choice of environment, any performance can be rationalized in a 
non-trivial way by a Bayesian equilibrium. In Sections IV.3 and IV.4 
we show that, even if both prior beliefs and preferences are specified 
g Qriori for each vector of types, any reasonable performance can
still be rationalized as a Bayesian equilibrium for some utility 
functions consistent with those preferences. In particular, if and 
only if truth is a dominated strategy for that performance function 
4 
illli! mechanism can we not rationalize behavior. (A corollary of this
result is that if we can choose utilities, the only .behavior we cannot 
rationalize is the behavior of agents who do not use a dominant 
strategy when one is available. ) 
This key result can be stated more starkly. Given .fil!Y 
Bayesian game with positive priors and .fil!Y strategy which is not
dominated, there is g monotonically increasing transformation of the
utility functions such that the given strategy is g Bayesian 
equilibrium of the transformed game. Since the transformation may 
need to depend on the entire vector of types, we consider, in Section 
IV.5, restrictions on utilities, Some results are obtained but a full
characterization remains to be done. 
A summary of all the results and some observations are 
provided in Section V. For now let me simply state what I consider to 
be the main finding of this research: even if preferences and beliefs 
of all agents, as well as the game form, are �-specified, .fil!Y non­
dominated behavior can be rationalized as Bayesian equilibrium 
behavior. Apparently arbitrary non-dominated behavior should be 
eliminated g priori as not being sensible, only if one is willing to
assume very specific functional forms for utilities and beliefs. 
II. THE FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
The context of my analysis is the Bayesian collective-choice 
problem. Although I am convinced that most of my results can be 
extended to more general Bayesian incentive problems, I have chosen 
this context for ease of comparison to other papers. A Bayesian 
collective-choice problem is an incomplete information game in which 
outcomes are jointly feasible for all players together. A mechanism 
is used to provide the collective choice, given information provided 
by the agents. For a clear presentation of this model and its 
philosophical foundations see Myerson [17]. 
More formally, there are n agents numbered i = 1, • • •  , n. We 
let Ti denote the set of possible � of agent i, and let
T = T1 X • • •  X Tn. D is the set of possible outcomes or group
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choices. Each agent has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, 
ui(d, t), which denotes the payoff to i if d is the group choice and if
t = (t1, • • •  , tn) is the vector of agents' types. Each agent also has a
i 1 i� probability function p (t_i, ti)' where t_i a T_i = T X • • •  X T X 
Ti+l X • • •  X Tn, which denotes the subjective probability that player
i would assign to the event t_i if i's actual type were ti.
The tuple a= [T, D, u1,p1, • • •  , un, pn] is called a Bayesian
collective-choice problem by Myerson. We assume, as is standard, that 
the structure of a is common knowledge to all players and that each i 
knows his own type. I will call the 2-tuple of functions, 
i e , the characteristic of i and the vector e = <e1, • • •  , en),
the environment. This language is consistent with that pioneered by 
Hurwicz [7] and in common use in the literature. 
To model the method by which outcomes are selected, as a 
function of players' types, I use the concept of a mechanism (Hurwicz 
[7]), sometimes called a game-form (Gibbard [3]). A mechanism is a 
pair, <M, g) where M = M1 X • • •  X Mn. The set Mi is the possible
messages agent i can use and M is called the language. The outcome 
rule g(m1, • • •  , mn) maps M into probability measures on D. We let A(D)
be the set of all such measures and assume the structure of <M, g> is 
common knowledge. This model of a mechanism is perfectly general and 
can cover sealed-bid auctions, oral auctions in which players oral 
responses can depend on others' responses, bargaining models, 
political processes, etc. Messages can be simple numbers, a monetary 
bid, or complex conditional responses of the form, if he says a and 
she says b and then he says c, I will say d. Thus, even though one 
may not know how to explicitly describe the mechanism of a particular 
complicated institution such as the experimental Double Oral Auction 
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or the used car market, it is possible to consider them, conceptually, 
as mechanisms. 
Given a mechanism <M,g), agents choose messages mi as a
function of their types, and their common knowledge. We call a 
mapping pi : Ti -7 Mi a strategy for i and sometimes use pi(ti, g, a)
to denote its (possible) dependency on the common knowledge of (g, a). 
Vectors of strategies of particular interest as the fundamental 
solution concept in this model are the Bayes equilibria for the 
mechanism (M, g> in the collective choice game a = <T, D, e>. We let 
µ(d, m) be the probability assigned to d by the measure g(m) a A(D). 
Then 
f i i( 1 1 n( n u (d, t)p t_i, ti)µ(d, p (t ), • • • •  p t ))dd dt_i
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represents the expected utility payoff to i if i's type is ti and if
p = <p1, , • •  , pn> is the vector of strategies used by each player, where
f is the appropriate Riemann-Stieljes integral, Formally,
p• = <p•1, • • •  , p•n> is a Bayesian equilibrium of g in a, if and only
if, for each player i, p•i is a function from Ti to Mi such that for
each ti e Ti
fui (d, t)pi(t_i, ti)µ(d, p•(t)) dd dt_i =
where 
max fui(d, t)pi(t_i, ti)µ(d, p• (t)/mi) dd dti
mieMi 
I will sometimes use p• (t; a,g) to represent the dependency of the 
Bayes-equilibrium on the common knowledge of a and <M, g>. 
It is convenient to have a way to summarize the net result of 
the combination of a,g and p•, This is typically done with a 
performance function which describes the choice, d, made for each 
vector of types, t. Formally, we call the function II : T � A(D), 
where Il(t) = g (p (t)), the performance of g in a for the strategy p, 
Of particular interest is the performance of g in a for the Bayes­
equilibrium strategy.1 We will denote that as II• (t) = g (p•(t; g, a)). 
III. QUESTIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
Two main types of questions have been addressed in this 
framework. The first type, generally called Optimal Mechanism Design, 
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asks: Given a if p• is Bayes equilibrium what performance is possible 
by varying the mechanism? Also, what mechanism gives the best 
performance? This type of question was posed but unanswered in 
Hur�icz [8], Later papers by Harris and Raviv [5], Harris and
Townsend [6], Matthews [12), Myerson [16) , and Wilson [22) , have 
provided some answers. Wilson's paper provides a good summary, The 
research rests on the revelation principle ( first formalized by 
Gibbard [3]), Since this principle is of importance to our later 
results let us take a brief glimpse. 
We call any mechanism <M, g> a direct-revelation mechanism if 
Mi = Ti for all agents i. That is, each agent announces a, possibly
false, type which is used by g (t1, • • •  , tn) to pick µ e A(D), Of 
particular interest are direct-revelation mechanisms for which truth 
is a reasonable strategy. We call a mechanism <M, g> an incentive-
compatible direct-revelation mechanism for a (an icdr) if and only if 
Mi = Ti for all agents and p•i(ti) = ti, for all ti e Ti and all i, is
a Bayes equilibrium for g in a. 
[Note: This does not require that p• be the unique Bayes equilibrium. 
See Postlewaite-Schmeidler [19) for some of the problems of non-
uniqueness. ] 
Theorem 1: (Revelation Principle, Gibbard [3]) Given <M, g), a, and 
pi : Ti �Mi, for each i, such that pi(Ti) =Mi.
A, p is a Bayes equilibrium for <M, g> in a 
if and only if 
B, <T,a>. where a {t) = g {p {t)) Vt, is an icdr in a .
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Remark: The condition that pi{Ti) = Mi is needed to show that B � A.
The statement that A � B is valid even if pi{Ti) c Mi ,
Thus one answer to the question, what performance is possible, 
is that any function from T to A{D) which is itself an icdr is a 
possible performance function for some mechanism and only those 
functions are possible, ·The question, what mechanism gives the best 
performance, involves choosing among all icdr's. The standard method 
is to define a concept of efficiency and then to select an efficient 
icdr. Since we will not need that machinery for this paper, we refer 
the interested reader to Myerson [17]. 
The second type of common question has been concerned with the 
implementation of desired performance. It has been asked: given 
a and n ,  does there exist a mechanism <M,g> such that, if p• is a
Bayes equilibrium for g in a then g {p• {t)) = ll {t)? This question has 
been addressed by Laffont and Maskin [9], Postlewaite and Schmeidler 
[19], and Ledyard [10], among others. Using the Revelation Principle, 
the answer is yes only if n is itself an icdr mechanism. 2 The
converse needs some additional assumptions. See Theorem 2 below. 
One can argue that much of the above is an essentially 
normative approach to behavior in strategic situations with 
differential information. While the answers to the first question, 
what can be the performance of some g in a ,  give some direction to the 
positive construction of explanatory models, they do not go far 
enough, We need to know the answer to the following question: given 
T, D, <M,g> and TI does there exist a such that if p• is a Bayes­
equilibrium for g in a then g {p• { )) = TI{ ), In effect, given the 
institution <M,g>, can we "rationalize" the performance TI as the 
result of Bayesian behavior?3
Since I have already indicated in the introduction why one 
should be interested in this question, let me turn to an initial 
answer which is closely related to the revelation principle. 
Theorem l: Given a, TI, and <M,g>.
Ti � Mi, for each i, such that:
A.2:  p is a Bayes-equilibrium for <M,g> in a ,  and 
A, 3 : TI { t) = g [p { t) ] 
if and only if 
Vt e T,
B. The following are true: 4
B.1: Cmlg {m) TI<t)) fo!L Vt e T, 
B.2: There is a selection 
n <t>J Vt
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B.3: <T,Il> is an icdr mechanism in a. 
Proof: (A � B) A. 3 implies B. 1,  since then 
lHt) a {mlg(m) = Il (t) ) ,  Vt a T. 
To establish B. 2, let �i(ti) = pi(ti) for all ti e Ti. A. 1
and A. 3 then imply B.2. 
B. 3 follows, using theorem 1, from A. 2. 
(B � A) Let pi(ti) = �i(ti) Vti a Ti and Vi. Then
�i(Ti) = Mi implies A.1. Also B. 2 implies that g(�(t)) = Il(t) for
each t which implies A. 3. Finally using theorem 1 and the fact that 
pi(Ti) = Mi, B, 3 implies A.2.
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(QED) 
Remark: As in Theorem 1, the range conditions that �i(Ti) = Mi and
A. 1 are only needed to show that B � A. The opposite implication 
that A � B can be established without these. 
This Theorem is mainly the revelation principle with condition 
B.2 added to ensure that the performance correspondence can be 
"decomposed" into individual behavioral components consistent with 
<M,g>. It is similar, but not quite identical, to the requirement 
that {mlg(m) = Il(t) ) be a coordinate correspondence from T to M in 
the sense of Mount and Reiter [15], 
A corollary to Theorems 1 and 2 provides the main principle of 
analysis in modeling and rationalizing observed behavior. 
Corollary !.!: i i i Given D,T, <M,g>, and & : T --7 M ,  for all i, such
that &i(Ti) = Mi. 3 a such that & is a Bayes equilibrium for g in a
if and only if 3 a such that <T,g(&( ') ) )  is an icdr mechanism in a. 
If we observe the behavior & in the institutional setting 
described by <M,g>, we will be able to say agents acted as if they 
1 2  
were playing a Bayesian game if and only i f  there is some environment 
a such that the performance mapping Il(t) = g [&(t)] is itself an icdr 
mechanism in that environment. 
The conclusion of this section is obvious. Leaving aside 
issues of complexity, computability, misperceptions, and the size of 
the message space, most remaining modeling questions will be answered 
once we know for which pairs, <a, Il >, of environments and performance 
maps, <T, Il > is an icdr mechanism in a. I turn to that now. 
IV. INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE DIRECT REVELATION
When can we find an environment, a, such that the direct 
revelation mechanism II is incentive compatible in a? Or, when can we 
rationalize the performance II? The answers, provided in this 
section, depend on the prior restrictions one places on the allowable 
choices of a. As we will see, unless utilities and priors, <ui,pi),
are constrained to lie in a very narrow set, virtually any II is 
incentive compatible in some allowable a. 
IV. 1 .  No g priori restrictions
Our first result is that anything is rationalizable as Bayes 
Equilibrium behavior. This is trivial but is included for 
completeness and to provide motivation for the more complicated later 
propositions. 
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Theorem 1: Given <D,T>. There is an e such that every function from 
T to D is a Direct Revelation Incentive Compatible Mechanism in 
a =  <D,T,e), 
Proof: For every agent i, and every type ti a Ti, define
i i i a ( t ) for all (d,t_i) where a ( ') is any function from
Ti to R1• Let pi(',ti) be any measure on T_i' Then, since i is
indifferent among outcomes, anything, including �i(ti) =ti, is a
Bayes equilibrium for (T,Il> in this environment, for any mapping 
II : T � A (D) 
IV.2. Anx Certainty Mechanism Can Be Rationalized
(QED) 
The previous theorem is not an entirely fair test of the power 
of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium behavior. There are two 
obvious ways to make the construction of the required a more 
difficult: restrict the choice of ui and pi or strengthen the concept
of incentive compatibility. We will try the latter first. 
Definition: A direct revelation mechanism Il : T � A (D) is strictly 
incentive compatible in a if and only if, for all i, ti a Ti, s a Ti
such that µ(d,t) f µ(d,t/s) for some (d,t_i),
where 
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and µ(d,t) is the probability assigned to d by the measure Il(t), 
For strict incentive compatibility, truth must be a unique 
maximizer of expected utility, unless the mechanism doesn't care. The 
mechanism can be indifferent, but an agent can not. 
Remark: The existence of e such that Il is a strictly icdr mechanism 
in (D,T,e) when D and T are finite, is equivalent to the existence of 
vectors zi for all i and all l a Ti such that, for all l a Ti,
when t = ( t/O and 3<d,t) such that µ(d,t) f µ(d,t/s), This is true
because, given zi (d,t_i), we can easily find ui(d,t) and pi ( t_i,ll
such that 
Myerson [17] contains a full development of some of the implications 
of this insight. 
We can turn to the theory of linear inequalities for our 
answers. In this case we use a variation on Farkas' Lemma. 
Theorem ,1: ( Gale [2] , Theorem 2.10) If D and T are finite, 3z such
that 




-i for all (d,t_i)eD X T ,
Many of our results will be more easily interpreted for 
mechanisms which only assign probability 0 or 1 to any d e D. 
Definition: A direct revelation mechanism IT : T � D is called a _g-
mechanism (certainty mechanism), Those mechanisms such that 
Il : T � A(D) which are not a-mechanisms are called Q-mechanisms 
(probabilistic mechanisms), 
Remark: Sometimes concentration of the analysis on a-mechanisms can 
be done without loss of generality, This is because icdr mechanisms 
form a polyhedron, a closed convex set, given a, which can be 
described by its extreme corners, where µ(d,t) = 0 or 1. However, 
since we begin with the mechanism and not a, we must consider p-
mechanisms as well as a-mechanisms. 
Corollary f,l: Given any a-mechanism, Il : T � D, with T and D
finite 3e such that IT is strictly incentive compatible in 
a= ( D, T,e), 
Proof: Pick i and t s Ti. We eliminate any s for which
I I -i Il(t O =IT ( t s) for all t_i e T . Then, applying Theorem 4,
suppose the desired Z vector does not exist, But then 3x £, 0 such
that L s xs [µ (d,t/O - µ (d,t/s)] = 0 and x f- o. 
For each s', 
" " " " 3t_i such that IT<t/s') = d F g (t/l), Thus
\ ,. " \ " 
Ls xs [µ(d,t/l) - µ (d,t/s)] Ls xs [O - µ (d,t/s)]
= -x s' 
" 
L s F s' xsµ (d,t/s) o. 
This is true only if xs, = o. Therefore the only solution has x 0
which is a contradiction, 
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(QED) 
Corollary f,z: Given any p-meohanism Il : T � A (D) with T and D
i i 3 " " -i finite such that Vi, ti e T , s e T , ( d,t_i) e D X T such that
either 
" " " " " " ,. ,. µ(d,t) = 1 > µ (d,t/s) or µ (d,t) = 0 < µ (d,t/s), 
3a = (D,T,e) such that P is strictly incentive compatible in a. 
Proof: Essentially the same as Corollary 4.1. 
Remark: The condition in Corollary 4.2 is a sufficient condition 
( QED) 
which is not close to being necessary. I have no easily interpretable 
necessary and sufficient condition. 
Remark: It is possible to make precise the statement that almost all 
direct revelation mechanisms (including p-meohanisms) are 
rationalizable. 
Corollary i·1: Given D, T, finite, let 
lP _ (µ DX T � [0,1] l [ dµ(d,t) = 1 Vt e T}
be the set of all possible direct revelation mechanisms, 3 an open 
dense subset lP • of lP such that if µ a lP • then 3e such that µ is
strictly incentive compatible in a= (D,T,e). 
Proof: Write equation 1 from Theorem 4 as xA = O.  A sufficient
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condition for the existence of the desired e is that the rank of A 
equal llTi - 111 =� since then x = 0 is the only solution of ( 1), It
is easy to show that if rank (A) < � then one can perturb those values 
of µ such that µ (d,t) s ( 0,1) and generate A* such that rank (A*) = �. 
( Remember if µ(d,t) s {O, 1) there is no problem, )  One can also do 
this so that [ dµ* (d,t) = 1 for all t.
(QED) 
IV. 3. Restrictions on Preferences 
One can argue that the fact that any c-mechanism and almost 
any p-mechanism can be rationalized is not a very reasonable test of 
the hypothesis of Bayes equilibrium behavior since for most analyses 
there is a natural order on outcomes induced. by the physical 
description of types and outcomes. That is, the abstractions are not 
entirely independent of the events being modeled, 
let Ti 
For example, in a private values auction, it is standard to 
wi X vi where vi e vi is the monetary value of the object to
buyer i. The other component wi a wi is used to represent uncertain
characteristics such as risk attitudes, initial wealth, etc. In this 
case it is assumed that utility is positively increasing in ex post 
income. That is, u (d,t) > u (d',t') if viyi - xi > viy,i - x•i where
d = (d1, • • •  ,dn), di= <yi, xi>, yi is the number of units received,
and xi is the amount to be paid by i. For examples, see Milgrom and
Weber [14] , and Myerson and Satterthwaite [18] . 
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There are several ways to use the "natural order" to restrict 
our choice of models. I will concentrate on one. Since the natural 
order is to be imposed on d for a given t, we will assume we are 
given, g priori, a function wi(d,t) which generates that order,
Definition: Given D,T, w1 (d,t), • • .  ,wn(d,t) we say that
e = <u1,p1, • • •  ,un, pn> is consistent with w = <w1, • • •  ,wn> if and only
if, for all �. d, and t, [wi(d,t) > wi(�,t)] if and only if
Note that only the preference ordering over certainty 
outcomes, not the preference ordering over lotteries, is preserved, 
and it is not required that the ordering across vectors of types be 
preserved. For example, if wi(d,t) = wi( d,ti) ( that is w is
i independent of t_i) then consistency requires that u ( d,t_i,ti•) and
i A i u (d,t_i,ti•) order D in the same way, although u may still be
sensitive to the value of t_i. One possibility allowed is that
i i i i f [w (d,ti),t], where f1 > O and ft# O. 
We can now provide the central result. 
Theorem i Let D, T be finite, Let II : T � A(D) be a direct
revelation mechanism, where µ(d,t) is the probability assigned to d by 
IJ(t). Let the orders w = <w1(d,t), . . .  ,wn (d,t)> be given, There
exists ei = <ui, pi> for each i such that e is consistent with w,
pi(t) > O Vt, and such that II is an icdr mechanism in a= (D, T, e) )
if and only if, for every i, there do not exist ais � O VL, s e Ti
such that 
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L s#ais L d'.{d [ µ(d' , t/O - µ(d' , t/s) ] � 0 ( 2) 
for all d e D and all t = (t_i, l) e T, with strict inequality for one 
(d, t) , where d' � d if and only if wi(d', t/L> � wi(d, t/L>.
Proof: The strategy of the proof is to first show that the existence 
·of the desired environment e is equivalent to the existence of a
solution to a set of linear inequalities. Then Farkas' Lemma is
applied to get ( 2) ,
(i) 'Incentive compatibility as linear inequalities
Because of the structure of the problem we can treat the proof 
separately for each ti s Ti and for each i. Think of µ as an
r = L X K dimensional vector where L = l l T l l and K = l l n l l .  For any
utility, ui(d, t) , and beliefs, pi(t), let zi(d, t) = ui(d, t)pi(t) . The
vector zi e mr. Now, given l e  Ti, let zi be the
r - l l Ti l l  = r - KLi vector whose components are Z
i(d, t/L) . Let oi be
i i i the (r - KLi) X r matrix such that z1 = o1z The expected utility
received if i uses in the mechanism µ is 
If, instead, i were to use s e Ti then i's payoff would be
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Thus II is incentive compatible in a (D,T,e) if and only if
(3 .1) 
for all i, and all l, s e Ti.
(ii) e consistent with w as linear inequalities 
Given e and w, let zi(d, t) = ui(d, t)pi(t) as before. For e to
be consistent with wi it must be true that, for all d, t, d',
wi(d, t)> wi(d', t) if and only if ui(d, t) > ui(d', t).
This is equivalent to, for pi(t) > O, 
wi(d, t) ) > wi(d',t) if and only if zi(d,t) > zi(d', t) .
There are a variety of ways to represent this constraint on the choice 
of e. The most straightforward is first to renumber D, given t, so 
that for d= 1, • • •  , D', d > d' if and only if wi(d,t) > wi(d', t) and
for d= D'+l, • • •  ,K wi(d, t) = wi(d',t) for some d' .{ D'. Thus, we
create a strong order on d = 1,  • • .  , D' and number the d indifferent to 
these with numbers larger than D'. [Since D is finite, this can be 
done.] We then require that there is s > 0 such that 
zi(d, t) - zi(d-1,t) � e \Id, and Vt, with 2 .{ d .{ D'.
This can be represented in matrix form, where R� is an r X (D' - 1)
matrix for each t and e is 1 X (D' - 1) , as 
2 1 
(3.2) 
Since zi can be multiplied by scalers without affecting incentive 
compatibility, the restriction that e > 0 is equivalent to the 
restriction that ziR� > O Vt. 
For d = D'+l, • • •  ,D we require that 
and 
where d' is the appropriate number .{ D' such that wi(d,t) = wi(d',t).
This can also be represented in matrix form, where Ii is ant 
r X 2(D - D') matrix for each t, as 
i i Z It 2 0 for all t. (3,3) 
At this point we know that there is an e consistent with w 
such that Il is incentive compatible in (D, T, e) iff there are 
vectors cz1, • . •  ,Zn) such that equations (3) are true. But this is 
true iff Vi, VL s Ti and Vs > 0, 3 zi such that 
and 
zi<Qi - Q!)µ b 0 V s s T
i




where Rt/L and I�/l are the appropriate modifications of R� and I�. 
Applying Farkas' Lemma (see, e.g., Gale [2], Theorem 2 . 7) ,
3zi 
satisfying
rd, t/L 2 O, for 
D' + 1 .{ d .{ K
(4) if and only 
all 1 .{ d .{ D', 
if �als � O, for all s 
t_i £ 
-i 1 T and &d,t 2 0,
i and t_i s T such that
s Ti, 
2 




= 0 (5. 3) 
for all d,t_i s DX T
-i with 1 .{ d.{ D' where d' = d if and only if
d' > D' and wi(d',t/Ll = wi(d,t/Ll, and 
(5.4) 
for all d' > D', all t_i s T
-i.
Solving (5.3) and (5.4) for Yd+l,t and letting � represent the 
ordering derived from wi, we get 
rd+l,t/l = [��d
for all d,t_i' d .{ D', Since [(Qi - Q!
)µJ..,, 
= µ('d,t/O - µ('J,t/s)
dt/l 
and since rd,t/l b 0 for all d,t_i with strict inequality for at least 
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one d, t_i' the theorem is proven.
(QED) 
Remark�: If, in the statement of Theorem 5, we replace "icdr" with 
"strictly icdr" and replace "£, O" with "> 0" in equation (2) , the
statement remains true. 
If we restrict out attention to a-mechanisms, a very natural 
intuitive necessary and sufficient condition can be detailed. But 
first we need to define another property of direct revelation 
mechanisms. 
Definition: Given TI : T � D and preferences w = (w1,,,, , wn) where
wi : D X T � R1• We say that truth is dominated in II for w if there
is an i, a ti s Ti, and s s Ti, with ti# s such that
for all t_i e T
-i, with strict inequality for at least one t_i 8 T
-i.
We say that truth is weakly dominated in TI for w if there is an i a 
ti e Ti, and s s Ti, with ti# s such that
i I i i i i w CII(t s) , t_i, t  J f w [II(t) , t]'for all t- s T-
That is, truth is dominated in II for w if there is some type 
ti for whom there is a strategy which guarantees a better outcome than
ti, An example of such a mechanism and preferences is given after the
next result. 
Corollary �.£: Given the a-mechanism TI : T � D and preferences w, 
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with T and D finite, (a) 3a = (D, T,e) such that e is  consistent with 
w and II is an icdr mechanism in a if and only if truth is not 
dominated in II for w. (b) 3a = (D,T, e) such that e is consistent 
with w and II is a strictly icdr mechanism in a if and only if truth 
is not weakly dominated in n for w.
Proof: We prove (a) , (b) can be proved in a similar way. (if) If 
wi[TI(t), tJ = wiCTI<t/s) , tJ for all t_i then (2) holds with equality
3 -i for all d, t_i and we are done. If not, t_i s T such that
wi[II(t) , t] > wi[II(t/s) ,t]. Let d,,: II<t/s) .  Then
wi[Il(t), t] > wi(d, t) f wiCII<t/s) , tJ. Let
B = {s' s Tilwi(TI(t/s') .t) f wi(d, t) J
Equation (2) of Theorem 5 for (d, t_i) becomes -[ seBy
i(ti, s) f 0,
where yi(ti, s) is the appropriate y, Therefore, yi(ti, s) = O for all
s s B. Continue for all i, all s e Ti and all ti. It must be true
that ris 0 \Ii, {, s e Ti. Therefore, strict inequality is untrue
for any d, t _ i,
(only if) , Suppose truth is dominated in II for w. There is 
i and ti, s s Ti such that wi(II(t/s) , t) f wi[II(t) , t] for all t_i
with strict inequality 
except these i, s, ti, 




Let r�s = 0 for all k, {, s
For all k and for i when 
l F ti, (2) of Theorem 5 is trivially true. For i, ti, s, let
i i 
r i ht (d,t,t) - 11 ( d,t/s,t)J.t s 
Where 
"''" '/" t) -{: 
otherwise 
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Now if wi [Il( t/s),t] � wi(d,t) then wi [Il(t),t] � wi(d,t). Therefore,
i f (d,t_i,s' ti) f o. It is strictly greater for one t-i' d since
wi[Il(t),t] < wi [II(t/s),t] for one t_i. ( Let d = II ( t),) Thus
3 y f. 0 satisfying (2) .
(QED) 
We can rationalize the observed behavior if and only if truth 
is never a dominated strategy for any type. To see what type of 
restriction this is, consider the following situation which often 
arises in the early rounds of many experiments. Dominant strategies 
are available but not used. For example, many times subjects will bid 
less than their true values in sealed-bid second price auctions. In 
these, the highest bidder receives the item and pays an amount equal 
to the second highest bid. It is a dominant strategy to bid your true 
value. Can we explain this phenomenon? The answer is no. 
Corollary i.z: Given finite D, T, preferences w, and <M,g> such that
&i(ti) = mi is a strictly dominant strategy; that is,
for all m e M, with strict inequality for at least one m e M. Let 
fli(ti) = mi be the observed behavior such that, for some i,
fli(ti) � f>i(ti) for some ti B Ti and such that
{til&i(ti) = fli (ti)} � � for all ti e Ti. Let II<tl = g (fl (tl l .  fl
cannot be rationalized; that is I �e consistent with w such that II
is an icdr mechanism in a= (d,T,e). 
Proof: We know that 
for all t_i with strict inequality for at least one. Let
for all t_i with strict inequality for at least one t_i. Thus truth
is dominated in n for w.
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(QED) 
Individuals who do not follow a dominant strategy, when one is 
available, can not be rationalized. When there is no dominant 
strategy, most behavior can be rationalized. 
Corollary i.1: Given finite D, T, preferences w, mechanism <M,g>, and
observed behavior fli : Ti �Mi for each i such that fli(Ti) =Mi. 3e 
consistent with w such that fl is a Bayes equilibrium of <M,g> in 
a = (D,T,e) if and only if, Vi, fli is not a dominated strategy; that
is, for each ti a Ti there is no mi e Mi such that
wi[g(�(t) ) , t] � wi[g(�(t)/mi) , t] for all t_i e T
-i with strict
inequality for one t_i.
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Proof: Let II(t) = g(�(t) ).  � not dominated if  and only if truth is 
not dominated in n .  
In words, if and only if some type of some agent picks a 
message which is dominated by some other, can we not rationalize 
(QED) 
behavior. Any behavior responsive to sure things can be rationalized. 
A simple example with which to illustrate the results arises 
in the context of a one buyer-one seller bilateral bargaining game 
(Myerson-Satterthwaite [18]) . In this game 
if buyer gets the item 
otherwise 
and x is the monetary transfer to the seller. A direct revelation 
mechanism is Il(t) = [y(t) , x(t)]. Truth is dominated iff 
3 vB and z e TB such that
for all vs e Ts, with strict inequality for at least one vs. If, for
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then truth can not be dominated and y can be rationalized for most �· 
Myerson-Satterthwaite's structure plus incentive compatibility 
requires this inequality to hold for all vs. Our result shows that it
-s need hold only for one v , which can differ for different pairs
vB, �B. This fact generalizes to multi-unit auctions (Gresik-
Satterthwaite [4]) and provides the logical foundation, along with the 
revelation principle, for the observation that behavior in oral double 
auctions which satisfies the Easley-Ledyard [1] hypotheses is 
rationalizable as Bayesian equilibrium behavior consistent with 
preferences which are increasing in money. 
The above results for a-mechanisms can be easily generalized 
to cover all mechanisms with the following definition. 
Definition: Given Il : T � A(D) and preferences w, we say that truth 
is dominated in II for w if there is an i and ti, s e Ti, ti F s such
that 
for all d',t-i' with strict inequality for at least one (d',t-i) .
That is, Il (t/sl provides a probability measure on D which 
stochastically dominates (using wi) the probability measure if truth,
ti, is used. This definition is entirely consistent with that given
earlier and all results generalize in the obvious manner.
In conclusion, any direct revelation mechanism for which truth 
is not a dominated strategy can be rationalized, This means that, 
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given � preferences and � mechanism, fil1Y behavior which is not
dominated for those preferences can be rationalized in g .i@Y 
consistent with those preferences, and any behavior which is not 
weakly dominated can be strictly rationalized, 
IV. 4. Restrictions on Preferences and Beliefs 
One should be interested whether the weak conditions, 
developed in the previous sections, for rationalizing performance, 
rely mainly on the ability to manipulate utility or on the ability to 
manipulate beliefs, It is easy to show that it is indeed the former. 
If we are allowed to choose any ui and, in particular, a ui which may
depend on t_i, then even if we are constrained to a single vector of
beliefs, we can rationalize almost anything, This follows from an 
observation in Myerson [17], 
Theorem Q If (a) II is an icdr in a, and (b) (p•1, ,  . •  , p•n) are priors
i . on T_i for i 1 ,  • • •  , n  such that p• (t)) > 0 whenever
ui(d, t)pi(t) > 0, then II is an icdr in a• where a• (D,T, u•,p•) and
if p•i(t) � 0, 
otherwise 
Thus, given (p•1, , , , , p•0) with p•i(t) > O \Ii, t, (we call such p• 
positive priors) , II is rationalizable, constrained by w, iff II is 
rationalizable constrained by w and (p•1, • •  , , p•n) .
Proof: Straightforward. 
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Thus you give me a performance function, II, preferences, w, 
and positive priors p•, If truth is not dominated in II for w then I 
can always find utilities, u•, consistent with w, which rationalize II 
as the outcome of Bayesian equilibrium behavior. 
Stated another way: for fil1Y game with positive priors and .9llY 
strategies which are not dominated there is g monotonic increasing 
transformation of the utilities such that those strategies are � Bayes 
equilibrium in the transformed game, 
IV.S. Restrictions Q!l Utility 
To now we have seen that even if preferences and beliefs are 
prespecified, almost any performance function can be incentive 
compatible in some environment. On the other hand, we know from 
Gresik-Satterthwaite [4], Milgrom-Weber [14], Myerson-Satterthwaite 
[18], and Wilson [21] that that the joint assumptions of independent 
beliefs, transferable utility, risk neutrality and incentive 
compatibility do restrict possible performance. Therefore, we should 
not expect to be able to rationalize all performance if utilities are 
prespecified, Much can, however, still be done. 
Our first result provides the basis for the rest of this 
section. 
Theorem 1: Let II : T � A(D) , with D and T finite and let µ(d, t) be
the probability assigned by Il (t) to d e D. Let the utilities 
w = Cw1, • • •  , wn) be given where wi: DX T � R1 for all i,
There exist priors p• = (p•1, ,  • •  , p•n) ,  where
i -i p• ( ', ti) s A(T ) , such that II is an icdr mechanism in
i a =  (D,T,w,p•) if and only if there do not exist Yts � 0 for each i,
and all /, s s Ti such that
31 
(6) 
-i for all t_i s T 
Proof II is an icdr mechanism in (w,p•) if and only if for all i, and 
all L s s Ti,
Now apply Gale [2, Lemma 2.10], another variation of Farkas' 
Lemma, to get the result. 
As it stands, this is not very informative. Some sufficient 
conditions may provide a little help. 
(QED) 
Corollary 1.1: Given the a-mechanism II : T � D, and the utilities
w = <w1, • • •  ,wn> .  If, for each i and each tis Ti, 3 �-i such that,
for all s s Ti,
then 3 p• such that Il is incentive compatible in a (D,T,w,p•),
Proof: " Given such a t_i it is impossible to satisfy (6) with non-
i negative Yt si 
(7) 
(QED) 
Thus, if there is at least one possible vector of others' 
types such that i would not want to misrepresent, when faced with 
those types, we can provide beliefs such that i will never want to 
•ic" misrepresent. One such obvious prior is P t_i,ti) = 1. If
inequality (7) is strict, it is also possible to find an appropriate 
p•i such that p•i(t_i,ti) > 0 for all t-i' Thus, generally we could
restrict our attention to positive priors. 
Remark: This result is reminiscent of the results in Ledyard [10] 
where it is shown that, when the mechanism can not depend on common 
knowledge beliefs, incomplete information can not make a mechanism 
incentive compatible. Here, even if the mechanism can depend on 
common knowledge beliefs, a similar result obtains in one direction. 
" If ll is incentive compatible under complete information in (t_i,ti)
then 3 p•i such that n is incentive compatible in the incomplete
A 
information environment since if i believes t_i is highly probable
then i will always use the strategy ti.
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Corollary 1.1: Corollary 7.1 can be applied to p-mechanisms if (7) is
replaced by, \Is, 
Proof: Same as Corollary 1. 
(QED) 
A slightly more general, but still obvious, sufficient 
condition can be given. 
Corollary 1.1: If
i 3 -i Vi and tieT B !;;; T such that






Using the Myerson-Satterthwaite example with 
wi(dt) = vy(t) - x(t), one can see that if beliefs can be type
dependent then many outcome rules, <y('),x(')), can be rationalized. 
For example, there is no necessity for L t-iy(t_i,v) to be non­
decreasing in the buyer's value, v. 
For completeness, let us consider one further restriction to 
independent beliefs. 
Theorem l!_: Let 11 : T � A(D) with D and T finite and let µ (d, t) be 
the probability assigned d by 11 ( t). Let the utilities
w = (w1, • • •  ,wn) be given.
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There exist priors for each i, p•i e A(T-i), independent of 
ti' such that IT is incentive compatible in a = (D,T,w,p•) if and only
Vi and every /,s "Ti such that, for all t . "T-i,-J. 
i y/s < O. 
Proof: Virtually identical to the previous proof. 
(QED) 
Sufficient conditions can also be provided for this case 
although they are becoming increasingly uninformative. For example if 
there is a t_i such that
for all s e Ti and all I s Ti then 11 can be rationalized. Obviously, 
this is not close to being a necessary condition. 
It is highly likely that a complete characterization of 
rationalizable 11 given prior restrictions on utilities is not 
possible and each specific utility restriction must be handled on a 
case by case basis. Some success has been achieved by others in this 
direction. One example is the case of private values and independent 
beliefs. Another is the case of affiliated values. The reader can 
surely provide others.5
V. SUMMARY AND OPEN QUESTIONS 
There are at least three conclusions which one should reach as 
a result of the above theorems: 
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(1) Any observed behavior can be rationalized as the outcome 
of a Bayesian equilibrium of some game. 
(2) Even if types, outcomes, preferences on outcomes, 
positive prior beliefs, and an informationally consistent game form 
are all specified g priori, all strategic behavior which is not
dominated can be rationalized as the outcome of a Bayesian equilibrium 
of a game with the given game form, those priors and utilities 
consistent with those preferences. 
(3) Only when one places severe g priori restrictions on the
functional forms of utilities and priors does one get any meaningful 
restrictions on behavior. The assumptions of risk-neutral quasi­
linear preferences and independent values are very special. 
These conclusions are similar to those, from Walrasian general 
equilibrium theory, which apply to aggregate excess demand functions. 
(See Sonnenschein [20]). They do not imply that the hypothesis of 
Bayesian equilibrium has no content; rather that it is only the 
combination of assumptions on utilities, priors, and equilibrium which 
jointly provide meaningful implications. 
Several other observations can also be made. First, a full 
characterization of the triples of utilities, priors, and performance, 
such that that performance is incentive compatible for those 
environments, remains to be done. Second, among the class of 
incentive compatible direct mechanisms are those which are efficient; 
that is, either those one might expect to arise as the result of 
negotiation prior to play, or those which are durable. Although it 
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was unnecessary to consider efficiency when explaining observed 
behavior, it would be nice to know whether the hypothesis of 
efficiency places any additional meaningful constraints on behavior. 
That is, "what behavior can be rationalized as both incentive 
compatible and efficient?". My conjecture is that the conclusions 
will be similar to those above. Although a full analysis remains for 
future research, a simple observation may explain the basis for the 
conjecture. As is explained in Myerson [17] and Wilson [22] there are 
several concepts of efficiency. The two most commonly used are ex­
ante and interim. The key observation is that, for this line of 
research, the two are equivalent. That is, a particular performance 
function will be an interim efficient direct revelation mechanism in 
an environment if and only if there is a linear transformation of 
utilities such that that performance function is also an ex ante 
efficient mechanism in the transformed environment.6 Since the
transformation is linear it is, in the language of Myerson [17], 
evaluation-equivalent. Thus Bayesian equilibrium and incentive 
compatibility are unchanged. This means that behavior can be 
rationalized as interim efficient if and only if it can be 
rationalized as ex ante efficient. (For fixed utility, ex ante 
implies interim but not conversely. For fixed behavior, they are 
equivalent. ) Although it remains to be established, I suspect that 
only a fairly simple extra condition is needed to show that if there 
is an environment such that a given performance function is an 
incentive compatible direct revelation mechanism then there is a 
reasonable transformation of the utilities in that environment such 
that that behavior is interim efficient, and therefore, �-ante 
efficient. 
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As a third observation, none of the results in this paper 
should be taken as diminishing the normative content of Bayesian 
behavior in game-theoretic situations. Bayesian equilibrium remains a 
powerful way of thinking about strategic situations in which players 
have incomplete information. It is not unreasonable that players 
should play that way. However, in spite of the validity of the 
normative content of Bayesian equilibrium, I think one now has to be 
very careful of the conclusions one draws from models which employ 
Bayesian behavior as a positive theory. Since virtually any behavior 
can be rationalized with some utility function, any behavior can be 
justified as the result of a Bayesian equilibrium. Implications of 
models using specific utilities and priors need not necessarily be 
applicable to all data. For example, combined with the revelation 
principle, the work of Gresik and Satterthwaite [4] tells us7 that, in 
auctions involving multiple units, if there is risk neutrality, 
transferable utility, and independent uniform priors then no extra 
marginal units will be traded in say, oral double auctions under 
Bayesian behavior. The experimental evidence is strongly to the 
contrary. (S�e Easley and Ledyard [1]) , Does this mean that the 
observed behavior is unreasonable or that the hypothesis of Bayesian 
equilibrium is inapplicable? Obviously not. It strongly suggests 
either that risk attitudes are important or that beliefs may not be 
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independent. The specific functional assumptions are probably at 
fault, not the theoretical structure. We must look elsewhere for 
principles to explain these observed behaviors.8 It is an open
question whether there are natural restrictions on utility which 
prevent the uninformative explanation that all experimental and market 
generated observations are Bayesian equilibrium outcomes, 
The Bayesian approach to analyzing strategic situations with 
incomplete information remains a compelling model, Nevertheless, care 
must be exercised so that conclusions are drawn from general 
principles and not just from examples.9 It is highly likely that a
close fit to the data and transferability across institutions may 
ultimately be the only real test of the theory. 
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FOOTNOTES 
* This paper is an extensive revision of one presented in the Theory
workshop at Caltech and at the Institute for Mathematics and Its
Applications at the University of Minnesota. I thank both sets of
participants for their suggestions and comments. I especially
thank Kim Border and Charles Plott who asked the right questions
at the right time. The revision of the first version has
benefited from the insightful and careful comments of Steve
Matthews, Mark Satterthwaite, Robert Wilson and a good referee.
Finally, I thank the intransigent referee of Easley-Ledyard [1],
whose misguided refusal to consider the behavior proposed in that
as reasonable led me to the research reported here.
1. When there is more than one Bayesian equilibrium, we will consider
a suitable generalization Of n *, 
2. Another set of papers by Matthews [11], Milgrom [13], Milgrom and
Weber [14] and Wilson [21] pick a particular <M,g> and ask whether
its performance is good. For example, some ask whether Il ( ; n) is
an icdr as n -} m, See Wilson [22] for other references.
3. M. K. Richter has coined the phrase "revealed game theory" to
describe this type of issue.
4. B. 1 is needed to insure that B.2 is not vacuous.
5, The referee has pointed out that "investigation of weak 
restrictions on utility, such as risk aversion, might • be 
quite interesting." I agree, but have no specific thoughts or 
conjectures. 
6. Simply use the welfare weights associated with the interim
efficiency.
7. The main point of their work is the convergence of efficient
auctions to competitive equilibrium as the number of players
grows. I am refering to only a subset of that work.
8. For example, the apparently ad hoc model in Easley and Ledyard [1]
closely corresponds to observed behavior but does not seem
sensible to some economists. The results in this paper, however,
suggest that behavior consistent with the Easley-Ledyard
assumptions can be always be rationalized as the Bayesian
Equilibrium of an Oral Double Auction.
9. To paraphrase Robert Wilson's closing remarks in Wilson [23],
Bayesian behavior can explain lots of behavior; maybe too much.
REFERENCES 
1, David Easley and John Ledyard, "A Theory of Price Formation and 
Exchange in Oral Auctions," Center for Mathematical Studies in 
Economics and Management Science, Discussion Paper No. 461, 
Northwestern University, (rev. ) July 1982, 
41 
2. David Gale, "The Theory of Linear Economic Models," McGraw Hill, 
New York, 1960. 
3, A. Gibbard, Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result," 
Econometrica 41 (July 1973) , 587-602. 
4. Thomas A. Gresik and Mark A. Satterthwaite, "The Number of 
Traders Required to Make a Market Competitive: The Beginnings of 
a Theory, 11 Center for Ma thema ti cal Studies in Economics and 
Management Science, Discussion Paper No. 551 ,  Northwestern 
University, February 1983. 
5 ,  Milton Harris and Artur Raviv, Allocation mechanisms and the 
design of auctions, Econometrica 49 (November 1981), 1477-1499. 
6. Milton Harris and Robert M. Townsend, Resource allocation under 
asymmetric information, Econometrica 49 (January 1981) , 33-64. 
7. L. Hurwicz, Optimality and informational efficiency in resource 
allocation processes, in "Mathematical Methods in the Social 
Sciences" (K. J. Arrow, s. Karlin, and P. Suppes, Eds. ) ,  Chapt,
3, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1960. 
42 
8, L. Hurwicz, On informationally decentralized systems, in 
"Decision and Organization" (C. B. McGuire and R. Radner, Eds, ) ,  
North Holland Press, Amsterdam, 1972. 
9, J, Laffont and E, Haskin, The theory of incentives: An overview, 
in "Advances in Economic Theory" (Werner Hildebrand, Ed.) , Chapt. 
2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982. 
10. J. Ledyard, Incentive compatibility and incomplete information, 
in "Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences" (J, J. Laffont, 
Ed. ) ,  North Holland Press, Amsterdam, 1979, 
11. Steven Matthews, "Risk Aversion and the Efficiency of First- and 
Second-Price Auctions," CCBA Working Paper No. 586, University of 
Illinois, 1979. 
12. Steven Matthews, Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable 
tastes, J. Econ. Theory 30 (1983) , 370-400. 
13. Paul R. Milgrom, A convergence theorem for competitive bidding 
with differential information, Econometrica 47 (1979) , 679-688. 
1 4. Paul R. Milgrom and Robert J. Weber, A theory of auctions and 
competitive bidding, Econometrica 50 (September 1982),  1089-1122. 
15. K. Mount and S. Reiter, The informational size of message spaces, 
J. Econ. Theory 8 (1974) , 161-191. 
16. Roger B. Myerson, Optimal auction design, Mathematics of 
43 
Operations Research 6 {February 1981) , 58-73. 
17. Roger B. Myerson, "Bayesian equilibrium and incentive
compatibility: An introduction," Center for Mathematical Studies
in Economics and Management Science, Discussion Paper No. 548,
Northwestern University, February 1983.
18. Roger B. Myerson and Mark Satterthwaite, "Efficient mechanisms
for bilateral trading," Center for Mathematical Studies in
Economics and Management Science, Discussion Paper No. 469S,
Northwestern University, 1981; forthcoming in J. Econ. Theory,
May 1984.
19. A. Postlewaite and D. Schmeidler, Revelation and implementation
under differential information, in "Essays in Honor of Leonid
Hurwicz", University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis,
forthcoming.
20. H. Sonnenschein, Do walras' identity and continuity characterize
the class of community excess demand functions? J. Econ. Theory 6
(1973). 345-354.
21. Robert B. Wilson, "Double auctions," IMSSS Technical Report 391,
Stanford University, 1982. To appear in "Essays in Honor of
Leonid Hurwicz," University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
22. Robert B. Wilson, "Incentive efficiency of double auctions,"
IMSSS Technical Report 431, Stanford University, October 1983.
23. Wilson, Robert B. "Reputations in Games and Markets," HISS
Technical Report 434, Stanford University, November 1983.
44 
